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Abstract. Camellia is one of the widely used block ciphers, which has been included in the
NESSIE block cipher portfolio and selected as a standard by ISO/IEC. In this work, we ob-
serve that there exist some interesting properties of the FL/FL−1 functions in Camellia. With
this observation we derive some weak keys for the cipher, based on which we present the first
known 8-round zero-correlation linear distinguisher of Camellia with FL/FL−1 layers. This
result shows that the FL/FL−1 layers inserted in Camellia cannot resist zero-correlation lin-
ear cryptanalysis effectively for some weak keys since the currently best zero-correlation linear
distinguisher for Camellia without FL/FL−1 layers also covers 8 rounds. Moreover, by using
the novel distinguisher, we launch key recovery attacks on 13-round Camellia-192 and 14-round
Camellia-256 respectively. To our knowledge, these results are the best for Camellia-192 and
Camellia-256 with FL/FL−1 and whitening layers.
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1 Introduction
The block cipher Camellia was jointly proposed by NTT and Mitsubishi in 2000 [1]. It was
selected as one of the CRYPTREC e-government recommended ciphers in 2002 [2] and in-
cluded in the NESSIE block cipher portfolio in 2003 [3]. Later in 2005, it was adopted as
the international standard by ISO/IEC [4]. Camellia is a 128-bit block cipher which uses the
Feistel structure with key-dependent functions FL/FL−1 inserted every six rounds. It sup-
ports three different key sizes: 128, 192 and 256, and the number of rounds changes according
to the key size, i.e., 18 rounds for 128-bit key size (denoted as Camellia-128) and 24 rounds
for 192/256-bit key sizes (denoted as Camellia-192/Camellia-256, respectively).
So far there have been many cryptanalytic results for reduced-round Camellia by using dif-
ferent approaches such as differential and linear cryptanalysis [5], truncated differential crypt-
analysis [6, 7], integral attack [8–10], meet-in-the-middle attack [11], collision attack [9, 12],
impossible differential cryptanalysis [7, 13–19] and zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis [20].
As a matter of fact, most attacks presented before 2011 excluded the FL/FL−1 and whiten-
ing layers to ease the cryptanalysis, while recent attacks aimed at reduced-round Camellia
with FL/FL−1 and/or whitening layers. For example, in [13], several 6-round impossible
differentials of Camellia with FL/FL−1 layers were proposed, based on which some attacks
⋆ Corresponding authors.
were mounted on 10-round Camellia-192 and 11-round Camellia-256. The authors of [14]
introduced a 7-round impossible differential of Camellia including FL/FL−1 layers, with
which they presented improved attacks on 10-round Camellia-128, 10-round Camellia-192
and 11-round Camellia-256. Liu et al. [17] constructed some 7 and 8-round impossible differ-
entials of Camellia with FL/FL−1 layers and then attacked 11-round Camellia-128, 12-round
Camellia-192 and 13-round Camellia-256. In 2013, Bogdanov et al. [20] proposed attacks on
11-round Camellia-128 and 12-round Camellia-192 by using 7-round zero-correlation linear
distinguishers of Camellia with FL/FL−1 layers and the FFT technique.
Zero-correlation linear attack is one of the recent cryptanalytic methods introduced by
Bogdanov and Rijmen [21]. The attack is based on linear approximations with zero correla-
tion, which is different from the traditional linear cryptanalysis where linear characteristics
(hulls) with high correlations are used. The idea of zero-correlation linear attack can be con-
sidered as the projection of impossible differential cryptanalysis to linear cryptanalysis. To
construct a zero-correlation linear distinguisher, one always adopts the miss-in-the-middle
techniques as that used in impossible differential cryptanalysis. In [22, 23], Bogdanov et al.
proposed new models that can decrease the data complexity of zero-correlation linear crypt-
analysis. We refer to [20,22–24] for details of zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis on various
block ciphers such as CAST, CLEFIA, HIGHT, Skipjack, TEA and XTEA.
In this paper, we first rewrite the FL/FL−1 functions within Camellia in matrix forms,
which shows that for given keys, FL/FL−1 functions are indeed linear (affine) transforma-
tions. Thus the correlations of FL/FL−1 functions can only be 0 or ±1. From this we derive
some interesting properties of the FL/FL−1 functions. Then following these properties we
find some weak keys for the cipher, with which the first known 8-round zero-correlation lin-
ear distinguisher of Camellia with FL/FL−1 layers is presented. Note that this distinguisher
covers the same number of rounds as the best known zero-correlation linear distinguisher for
Camellia without FL/FL−1 layers. Consequently, our result demonstrates that FL/FL−1
layers cannot thwart zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis effectively in the case of some spe-
cific weak keys. Furthermore, we apply this new distinguisher to attack 13-round Camellia-192
and 14-round Camellia-256 respectively. Although our attacks require certain conditions for
15 subkey bits, they improve the existing cryptanalytic results on Camellia-192/256 with
FL/FL−1 and whitening layers which can be seen in Table 1.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec. 2, we give necessary notations,
brief description of Camellia and concise explanation of Fast Fourier Transform for zero-
correlation linear cryptanalysis. In Sec. 3, we present new properties for FL/FL−1 functions,
some weak keys for Camellia and an 8-round zero-correlation linear distinguisher for the
cipher under these weak keys. Then based on this distinguisher, Sec. 4 demonstrates key
recovery attacks on reduced-round Camellia-192/256. Finally, we summarize our paper in
Sec. 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
General notations: The following notations are used throughout the paper.
– ⊕ denotes bitwise exclusive OR (XOR).
– 0x denotes the hexadecimal notation.
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Table 1. Summary of the Attacks on Camellia with FL/FL−1 and Whitening Layers
Key Size Cryptanalysis Rounds Data Time(EN) Memory(Bytes) Source
192
Imp. Diff. 10 2121 CP 2175.3 2155.2 [13]
Imp. Diff. 10 2118.7 CP 2130.4 2135 [14]
Imp. Diff. 11∗ 2112.64CP 2146.54 2141.64 [17]
Imp. Diff. 11 2114.64CP 2184 2141.64 [17]
Imp. Diff. 12 2123CP 2187.2 2160 [17]
Multidim. Zero-Corr. 12 2125.7KP 2188.8 2112.0 [20]
Zero-Corr. 13∗ 2128KP 2169.83 2156.86 Sect. 4.1
256
Higher-order Diff. 11 293CP 2255.6 298 [25]
Imp. Diff. 11 2121 CP 2206.8 2166 [13]
Imp. Diff. 11 2119.6 CP 2194.5 2135 [14]
Imp. Diff. 12∗ 2121.12CP 2202.55 2142.12 [17]
Imp. Diff. 12 2116.17CP 2240 2150.17 [17]
Imp. Diff. 13 2123CP 2251.1 2208 [17]
Zero-Corr. 14∗ 2128KP 2234.92 2212.86 Sect. 4.2
CP: Chosen Plaintext; KP: Known Plaintext; EN: Encryptions; ∗: Weak Key
– ‖ denotes the concatenation operation.
– · denotes bitwise inner product.
– ∩,∪ denote bitwise AND and OR operations, respectively.
– X denotes bitwise complement of X, where X ∈ Fn2 .
– X ≪m denotes left rotation of X by m bits.
– X ≫m denotes right rotation of X by m bits.
– XL, XR denote the left and right halves of X, respectively.
Notations for key recovery attacks (i.e., notations used in Section 4):
– Pj , Cj , Kj denote the j-th bytes of plaintext P , ciphertext C and subkey K respectively,
numbered from left to right.
– P{j1,j2}, C{j1,j2}, K{j1,j2} denote Pj1‖Pj2 , Cj1‖Cj2 and Kj1‖Kj2 respectively.
– P [j], C[j], K[j] denote the j-th bits of plaintext P , ciphertext C and subkey K respectively,
numbered from left to right.
– P [j1, j2], C[j1, j2], K[j1, j2] denote P [j1]‖P [j2], C[j1]‖C[j2] and K[j1]‖K[j2] respectively.
2.2 Fast Fourier Transform for Zero-Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis
We briefly recall the FFT-based technique of computational complexity reduction for zero-
correlation linear cryptanalysis which was described in [20]. The objective of this technique
is to eliminate the redundant computations from the partial encryption/decryption in the
course of zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis.
Let ΓP → ΓD be a zero-correlation linear distinguisher for the first r − 1 rounds of an r-
round block cipher EK . After partial decryption of the last round, the linear distinguisher to
be evaluated becomes: ΓP ·P ⊕ΓD ·f
−1(K⊕C), where f−1(·) represents a partial decryption
of the last round for the k bits of K and C that influence the value of ΓD ·D.
Let x denote the plaintext-ciphertext bits involved in the linear distinguisher. Now we
define the 2k × 2k matrix M as follows:
M(K, C) = (−1)ΓD·f
−1(K⊕C), for all K, C ∈ {0, . . . , 2k − 1}.
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Then the bias of the linear distinguisher can be evaluated as the matrix-vector product MZ,
where Z is the vector corresponds to the parity of ΓP · P and the number of occurrences of
each possible value of x in all given plaintext-ciphertext pairs. As shown in [26], the matrix
M has a level-circulant structure resulting from the XOR between the ciphertext and the key
guess, thus this matrix-vector product can be computed efficiently by using the Fast Walsh-
Hadamard Transform (equivalent to a k-dimensional Fast Fourier Transform) with about
3k × 2k arithmetic operations. We refer to [20, 26] for more details of the FFT technique for
improving the computational complexity in linear cryptanalysis.
2.3 A Brief Description of Camellia
Camellia [1] is a 128-bit block cipher which adopts the Feistel structure with key-dependent
functions FL/FL−1 inserted every six rounds. It supports variable key sizes and the number
of rounds depends on the key size, i.e., 18 rounds for 128-bit key size and 24 rounds for
192/256-bit key sizes. Moreover, pre-whitening and post-whitening layers are included before
the first round and after the last round respectively. Fig. 1 gives a schematic description of
Camellia-192/256.
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Fig. 1. Schematic description of Camellia-192/256
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left and right halves of the input for the i-th round of Camellia, respectively. Then the i-th
round transformation of Camellia can be described as:{
Xi+1L = F (X
i
L, k
i)⊕XiR
Xi+1R = X
i
L,
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where ki denotes the i-th round key, and the round function F consists of the round key
addition, the nonlinear transformation S and the linear transformation P . There are four
8× 8 S-boxes S1, S2, S3 and S4 adopted in S, and each S-box is used twice in the sequence
(S1, S2, S3, S4, S2, S3, S4, S1). The linear transformation P : (F
8
2)
8 → (F82)
8 and its inverse
P−1 are defined as follows:
z1 = y1 ⊕ y3 ⊕ y4 ⊕ y6 ⊕ y7 ⊕ y8 y1 = z2 ⊕ z3 ⊕ z4 ⊕ z6 ⊕ z7 ⊕ z8
z2 = y1 ⊕ y2 ⊕ y4 ⊕ y5 ⊕ y7 ⊕ y8 y2 = z1 ⊕ z3 ⊕ z4 ⊕ z5 ⊕ z7 ⊕ z8
z3 = y1 ⊕ y2 ⊕ y3 ⊕ y5 ⊕ y6 ⊕ y8 y3 = z1 ⊕ z2 ⊕ z4 ⊕ z5 ⊕ z6 ⊕ z8
z4 = y2 ⊕ y3 ⊕ y4 ⊕ y5 ⊕ y6 ⊕ y7 y4 = z1 ⊕ z2 ⊕ z3 ⊕ z5 ⊕ z6 ⊕ z7
z5 = y1 ⊕ y2 ⊕ y6 ⊕ y7 ⊕ y8 y5 = z1 ⊕ z2 ⊕ z5 ⊕ z7 ⊕ z8
z6 = y2 ⊕ y3 ⊕ y5 ⊕ y7 ⊕ y8 y6 = z2 ⊕ z3 ⊕ z5 ⊕ z6 ⊕ z8
z7 = y3 ⊕ y4 ⊕ y5 ⊕ y6 ⊕ y8 y7 = z3 ⊕ z4 ⊕ z5 ⊕ z6 ⊕ z7
z8 = y1 ⊕ y4 ⊕ y5 ⊕ y6 ⊕ y7 y8 = z1 ⊕ z4 ⊕ z6 ⊕ z7 ⊕ z8,
where (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6, y7, y8) and (z1, z2, z3, z4, z5, z6, z7, z8) are the input and output of
P , respectively.
The key schedule algorithm of Camellia-192/256 applies 6-round Feistel structure to derive
two 128-bit intermediate variables KA and KB from KL and KR (See Fig. 2), where KL, KR
are defined as below:
– For Camellia-192, KL is set as the left 128-bit value of the master key K, and KR =
(KR)L‖(KR)R, where (KR)L is the right 64-bit value of K and (KR)R = (KR)L.
– For Camellia-256, the master key K is divided into two 128-bit variables KL and KR, i.e.,
K = KL‖KR.
All round keys, whitening keys and subkeys used in the FL/FL−1 layers can be generated
from KL, KR, KA and KB (See Table 2). We refer to [1] for more details of Camellia.
3 8-round Zero-Correlation Linear Distinguisher of Camellia with
FL/FL−1 Layers under Weak Keys
3.1 Some Properties of FL−1 Function
In this section, we will give some properties of FL−1 function, and similar results can be
achieved for FL function. We refer to Fig. 1(b) for the definitions of FL/FL−1 functions.
Property 1. Let 0 6= u = (uL, uR), v = (vL, vR) be the input and output masks of the FL
−1
function respectively, where uL, uR, vL, vR ∈ (F
8
2)
4. Let kl = (klL, klR) be the subkey used in
the FL−1 function, where klL, klR ∈ (F82)
4. Then the correlation of the FL−1 function is ±1
if following conditions are satisfied:
vR = uR ⊕ (uL ∩ klR),
vL = uL ⊕ ((vR ≫1) ∩ klL).
Otherwise, the correlation is 0.
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Fig. 2. 6-round Feistel Structure for Generating KA and KB
Proof. Let the input and output of FL−1 function be
I = (IL, IR) = (IL[1], . . . , IL[32], IR[1], . . . , IR[32])
and
O = (OL, OR) = (OL[1], . . . , OL[32], OR[1], . . . , OR[32]),
respectively. Let klL = (klL[1], . . . , klL[32]), klR = (klR[1], . . . , klR[32]). Since
OL ∩ klL =
(
OL[1] OL[2] · · · OL[32]
)


klL[1] 0 · · · 0
0 klL[2] · · · 0
...
... · · ·
...
0 0 · · · klL[32]

 , OLPklL
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Table 2. Subkeys Used in Camellia-192/256
subkey value subkey value
Prewhitening kw1 (KL ≪0)L
kw2 (KL ≪0)R
F (Round 1) k1 (KB ≪0)L F (Round 13) k
13 (KR ≪60)L
F (Round 2) k2 (KB ≪0)R F (Round 14) k
14 (KR ≪60)R
F (Round 3) k3 (KR ≪15)L F (Round 15) k
15 (KB ≪60)L
F (Round 4) k4 (KR ≪15)R F (Round 16) k
16 (KB ≪60)R
F (Round 5) k5 (KA ≪15)L F (Round 17) k
17 (KL ≪77)L
F (Round 6) k6 (KA ≪15)R F (Round 18) k
18 (KL ≪77)R
FL kl1 (KR ≪30)L FL kl
5 (KA ≪77)L
FL−1 kl2 (KR ≪30)R FL
−1 kl6 (KA ≪77)R
F (Round 7) k7 (KB ≪30)L F (Round 19) k
19 (KR ≪94)L
F (Round 8) k8 (KB ≪30)R F (Round 20) k
20 (KR ≪94)R
F (Round 9) k9 (KL ≪45)L F (Round 21) k
21 (KA ≪94)L
F (Round 10) k10 (KL ≪45)R F (Round 22) k
22 (KA ≪94)R
F (Round 11) k11 (KA ≪45)L F (Round 23) k
23 (KL ≪111)L
F (Round 12) k12 (KA ≪45)R F (Round 24) k
24 (KL ≪111)R
FL kl3 (KL ≪60)L Postwhitening kw
3 (KB ≪111)L
FL−1 kl4 (KL ≪60)R kw
4 (KB ≪111)R
and left rotating a row vector γ ∈ F322 by 1 bit can be characterized by
γ ≪1= γ


0 0 0 · · · 0 1
1 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 1 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
... · · ·
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 1 0

 , γP1,
therefore,
IR = OR ⊕ ((OL ∩ klL) ≪1) = (OL(PklLP1))⊕OR.
Similarly, since IR ∪ klR = (IR ∩ klR)⊕ IR ⊕ klR = (IR ∩ klR)⊕ klR, we have
IL = OL(E32 ⊕ PklLP1PklR)⊕ORPklR ⊕ klR,
thus
(IL, IR) = (OL, OR)
(
E32 ⊕ PklLP1PklR PklLP1
PklR E32
)
⊕ (klR,0),
where E32 is the 32× 32 identity matrix and 0 is the 1× 32 zero vector.
Notice that P TklL = PklL and P
T
klR
= PklR , accordingly, if the input mask of FL
−1 is
0 6= u = (uL, uR), to make the correlation non-zero (i.e., ±1), the output mask should be
(vL, vR) = (uL, uR)
(
E32 ⊕ PklLP1PklR PklLP1
PklR E32
)T
= (uL, uR)
(
E32 ⊕ PklRP
T
1 PklL PklR
P T1 PklL E32
)
,
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which implies
vR = uR ⊕ (uLPklR),
vL = uL ⊕ vRP
T
1 PklL ,
therefore
vR = uR ⊕ (uL ∩ klR),
vL = uL ⊕ ((vR ≫1) ∩ klL).
According to Property 1, we get the following:
Property 2. Let 0 6= u = (uL, uR), v = (vL, vR) be the input and output masks of the FL
−1
function as defined in Property 1. Suppose that the correlation of the FL−1 function is
nonzero (i.e., ±1), then u = v if and only if
0 = uL ∩ klR,
0 = (uR ≫1) ∩ klL.
3.2 8-round Zero-Correlation Linear Distinguisher under Weak Keys
By applying miss-in-the-middle technique, we find that
((a, a, 0, 0, a, 0, a, a), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0))
→ ((0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (h, 0, 0, h, 0, h, h, h))
is an 8-round zero-correlation linear hull for Camellia under some weak keys (covering rounds
6–13, see Fig.3), where a, h ∈ F82 denote any non-zero values, and the weak keys satisfy the
following conditions:
(a, a, 0, 0) ∩ kl2R = 0, ((a, 0, a, a) ≫1) ∩ kl
2
L = 0;
(h, 0, 0, h) ∩ kl3R = 0, ((0, h, h, h) ≫1) ∩ kl
3
L = 0.
(1)
This is actually the first known 8-round zero-correlation linear distinguisher of Camellia with
FL/FL−1 layers. Next we will show that the above 8-round linear hull has correlation 0.
According to the correlation matrices results presented in [27], the correlation of a linear
hull can be computed as a sum of key-dependent signed products of correlations of linear
approximations that are chained over consecutive rounds. Thus for the weak keys satisfying
Eq. (1), we will demonstrate that all 8-round linear trails (covering rounds 6–13) with in-
put and output masks being ((a, a, 0, 0, a, 0, a, a), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) and ((0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0),
(h, 0, 0, h, 0, h, h, h)) have correlation 0, which indicates that the corresponding 8-round linear
hull has correlation 0. The detailed explanation is given below:
– For the linear trails that the input and output masks of FL−1 function (Note that the
FL function along the encryption direction is regarded as the FL−1 function along the
decryption direction) are not equal, the correlations of these trails are 0 according to
Property 2 given in Section 3.1 and Piling-up Lemma presented in [28].
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Fig. 3. 8-round zero-correlation linear distinguisher of Camellia with FL/FL−1 layers
– As to the linear trails that the input and output masks of FL−1 function are equal, we can
deduce as follows (the mask evolution can be seen in Fig.3 where (ΓXiL, ΓX
i
R) denotes
the input mask of round i, and ΓIiKS , ΓO
i
KS denote the input and output masks of the
KS function in round i):
• Along the encryption direction: We only consider the linear trail with non-zero corre-
lation. Hence, given the mask (ΓX6L, ΓX
6
R) = ((a, a, 0, 0, a, 0, a, a), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)),
the mask after three rounds (i.e., (ΓX9L, ΓX
9
R)) must have the form ((0, 0, 0, 0, c, 0, 0, 0),
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(c1 ⊕ a, c2 ⊕ a, 0, 0, a, c6, c7 ⊕ a, c8 ⊕ a)) if the corresponding 3-round linear trail has
non-zero correlation, where c, c1, c2, c6, c7, c8 ∈ F
8
2 are unknown non-zero values.
• Along the decryption direction: Given the mask (ΓX14L , ΓX
14
R ) = ((0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0),
(h, 0, 0, h, 0, h, h, h)), the mask after three rounds (i.e., (ΓX11L , ΓX
11
R )) must have the
form ((g1⊕h, 0, 0, g4⊕h, g5, g6⊕h, g7⊕h, h), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, g)) if the corresponding 3-
round linear trail has non-zero correlation, where g, g1, g4, g5, g6, g7 ∈ F
8
2 are unknown
non-zero values.
• If the upper 3-round linear trail and the lower 3-round linear trail can build up an
8-round linear trail (covering rounds 6–13), then we have:
ΓX10L = (c1 ⊕ a, c2 ⊕ a, 0, 0, a, c6, c7 ⊕ a, c8 ⊕ a),
ΓX10R = (g1 ⊕ h, 0, 0, g4 ⊕ h, g5, g6 ⊕ h, g7 ⊕ h, h),
Γ I10KS = (c1 ⊕ a, c2 ⊕ a, 0, 0, a, c6, c7 ⊕ a, c8 ⊕ a⊕ g).
Moreover, ΓO10KS can be derived from ΓX
10
R . Actually, to make the correlation of
the linear approximation of P transformation in round 10 non-zero (Otherwise, the
correlation of the whole 8-round linear trail will be 0 according to Piling-up Lemma),
ΓO10KS must have the form
(g1 ⊕ g5, g4 ⊕ g5 ⊕ g6, g1 ⊕ g4 ⊕ g6 ⊕ g7, g1 ⊕ g4 ⊕ g7, g4 ⊕ g6 ⊕ g7,
g1 ⊕ g4 ⊕ g5 ⊕ g7, g1 ⊕ g4 ⊕ g5 ⊕ g6, g1 ⊕ g5 ⊕ g6 ⊕ g7 ⊕ h).
• In order to make the correlation of the linear approximation ΓI10KS → ΓO
10
KS non-zero,
we have that
g1 ⊕ g4 ⊕ g6 ⊕ g7 = 0 and g1 ⊕ g4 ⊕ g7 = 0.
This implies g6 = 0, which contradicts the fact that g6 is a non-zero value. Therefore,
we can conclude that all 8-round linear trails (covering rounds 6–13) with input and
output masks being ((a, a, 0, 0, a, 0, a, a), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) and ((0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0),
(h, 0, 0, h, 0, h, h, h)) have correlation 0 for the weak keys satisfying Eq. (1).
4 Zero-Correlation Linear Attacks on Camellia
Firstly, by setting (a, h) as (0x01, 0x01) and (0x01, 0x02) respectively in Section 3.2, we obtain
two 8-round zero-correlation linear distinguishers of Camellia with FL/FL−1 layers under
the weak keys satisfying the following 15-bit conditions:
kl2L[1] = kl
2
L[9] = kl
2
L[25] = 0, kl
2
R[8] = kl
2
R[16] = 1,
kl3L[1] = kl
3
L[17] = kl
3
L[25] = 0, kl
3
R[8] = kl
3
R[32] = 1,
kl3L[16] = kl
3
L[24] = kl
3
L[32] = 0, kl
3
R[7] = kl
3
R[31] = 1.
(2)
Then based on these zero-correlation linear distinguishers, we can mount key recovery attacks
on 13-round Camellia-192 and 14-round Camellia-256 with FL/FL−1 and whitening layers.
4.1 Attacking 13-round Camellia-192
Let E denote the 13-round Camellia-192 with the FL/FL−1 and whitening layers from the
third round to the fifteenth round, and P = (PL, PR), C = (CL, CR) represent the plaintext
10
and ciphertext of E respectively. In the following, we will illustrate the attack on E with the
help of the above two 8-round zero-correlation linear hulls (See Fig. 4(a)). Note that in Fig.
4(a), the bytes denoted as ′∗′ need to be computed while the bytes denoted as ′0′ do not
require computation.
(CR)(CL)
(PR)(PL)
(CR)(CL)
(PR)(PL)
(*,*,*,*,*,*,*,*)(*,0,0,*,*,*,*,h)
(0,0,0,0,*,0,0,0)
(a,a,0,0,a,0,a,a)
(*,*,0,0,a,*,*,*)(*,*,*,*,*,*,*,*)
(a) Attack on 13-round Camellia-192
(*,0,0,*,*,*,*,h)(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,*)
16
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(h,0,0,h,0,h,h,h)(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)
(0,0,0,0,a,0,0,0)
(a,a,0,0,a,0,a,a)
(*,*,0,0,0,*,*,*)
(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)
(*,*,0,0,a,*,*,*) (0,0,0,0,*,0,0,0)
KS P
KS P
KS P
KS P
8-round zero-correlation linear 
distinguisher of Camellia
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3
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5
RX
6
LX
6
RX
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LX
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RX
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wk
4
wk
15
LX
15
RX
16
RX
KS P
4
LX
4
RX
(*,*,0,0,a,*,*,*)(*,*,*,*,*,*,*,*)
(b) Attack on 14-round Camellia-256
(*,0,0,*,*,*,*,h)(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,*)
17
LX
(*,0,0,*,*,*,*,0)
(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,*)
(h,0,0,h,0,h,h,h)
(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,h)
(h,0,0,h,0,h,h,h)(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)
(0,0,0,0,a,0,0,0)
(a,a,0,0,a,0,a,a)
(*,*,0,0,0,*,*,*)
(a,a,0,0,a,0,a,a) (0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)
(*,*,0,0,a,*,*,*) (0,0,0,0,*,0,0,0)
KS P
KS P
KS P
KS P
8-round zero-correlation linear 
distinguisher of Camellia
1
wk
2
wk
3
LX
3
RX
5
LX
5
RX
6
LX
6
RX
14
LX
14
RX
3
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4
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15
LX
15
RX
17
RX
KS P
4
LX
4
RX
KS P
16
LX
16
RX
Fig. 4. Attacks on 13-round Camellia-192 and 14-round Camellia-256
Before we give the detailed description of our attack, some notations are introduced
as follows. Let ka = k1w ⊕ k
3, kb = k2w ⊕ k
4, kc = k1w ⊕ k
5, kd = k3w ⊕ k
14 and ke =
k4w ⊕ k
15. Then by using the equivalent subkeys ka, kb, kc, kd and ke instead of the round
keys k3, k4, k5, k14 and k15, we can remove the whitening layers. Moreover, let F ij denote the
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function which computes the j-th output byte of the i-th round function. Let θ, ξ denote
PL‖PR,{1,2,6,7,8}‖CL,8‖CR,{1,4,5,6,7} and ka‖kb{1,2,6,7,8}‖k
d
8‖k
e
{1,4,5,6,7}, respectively. After that,
in order to take the full advantage of the FFT technique to reduce the time complexity, we
rewrite the linear approximation (a, a, 0, 0, a, 0, a, a) ·X6L ⊕ (h, 0, 0, h, 0, h, h, h) ·X
14
R = 0 by
doing partial encryption and decryption as shown below:
a · PR,5 ⊕ h · CR,8 ⊕ f(θ ⊕ ξ, k
a
5 ⊕ k
c
5)
= a · (kb1 ⊕ k
b
2 ⊕ k
b
7 ⊕ k
b
8)⊕ h · (k
e
1 ⊕ k
e
4 ⊕ k
e
6 ⊕ k
e
7),
(3)
where
f(θ ⊕ ξ, ka5 ⊕ k
c
5)
= a · (S2(θ5 ⊕ ξ5)⊕ θ{9,10,12,13} ⊕ ξ{9,10,12,13})
⊕h · (θ{15,16,18,19} ⊕ ξ{15,16,18,19})
⊕h · S1(F
15
8 (θ{15∼19} ⊕ ξ{15∼19})⊕ θ14 ⊕ ξ14)
⊕a · S2(S1(F
3
1 (θ{1,3,4,6∼8} ⊕ ξ{1,3,4,6∼8})⊕ θ9 ⊕ ξ9)⊕
S2(F
3
2 (θ{1,2,4,5,7,8} ⊕ ξ{1,2,4,5,7,8})⊕ θ10 ⊕ ξ10)⊕
S3(F
3
6 (θ{2,3,5,7,8} ⊕ ξ{2,3,5,7,8})⊕ θ11 ⊕ ξ11)⊕
S4(F
3
7 (θ{3∼6,8} ⊕ ξ{3∼6,8})⊕ θ12 ⊕ ξ12)⊕
S1(F
3
8 (θ{1,4∼7} ⊕ ξ{1,4∼7})⊕ θ13 ⊕ ξ13)⊕
θ5 ⊕ ξ5 ⊕ k
a
5 ⊕ k
c
5),
θj , ξj represent the j-th bytes of θ, ξ (numbered from left to right), and θ{j1,j2}, θ{j1∼j2},
ξ{j1,j2}, ξ{j1∼j2} (j1 < j2) denote θj1‖θj2 , θj1‖θj1+1‖ . . . ‖θj2 , ξj1‖ξj2 , ξj1‖ξj1+1‖ . . . ‖ξj2 respec-
tively.
Actually, Eq. (3) has zero correlation if and only if the following equation
a · PR,5 ⊕ h · CR,8 ⊕ f(θ ⊕ ξ, k
a
5 ⊕ k
c
5) = 0 (4)
has zero correlation. Thus we will present a zero-correlation linear attack on E based on Eq.
(4). The attack procedure is divided into two phases: Distillation and Analysis phase and
Master Key Recovery phase.
Distillation and Analysis.
1. Collect all the 2128 plaintext-ciphertext pairs (P, C) of E.
2. Let µ = θ‖PR,5[8]‖CR,8[8] and ν = θ‖PR,5[8]‖CR,8[7]. Initialize two vectors T and T
′,
each consisting of 2154 counters which correspond to all possible values of µ and ν, re-
spectively. Then for each pair (P, C), extract the 154-bit values µ and ν, and increase the
corresponding counters Tµ and T
′
ν by 1, respectively.
3. Initialize two vectors Z and Z ′, each composed of 2152 counters which correspond to all
possible values of θ. Then for each value of µ, extract the 152-bit value θ and add Tµ to
the corresponding counter Zθ if the parity of PR,5[8]⊕CR,8[8] is 0, and subtract Tµ from
Zθ otherwise. Do similarly for each value of ν and update the vector Z
′ accordingly.
4. Initialize two vectors Y and Y ′, each consisting of 2152 elements which correspond to all
possible values of θ ⊕ ξ. Then for each guess of the value of ka5 ⊕ k
c
5, do the following:
– In the case that (a, h) = (0x01, 0x01), compute the parity of f(θ⊕ ξ, ka5 ⊕ k
c
5) for each
value of θ ⊕ ξ. Set the value of Yθ⊕ξ as 1 if the parity is 0, and −1 otherwise. Do
similarly for the case that (a, h) = (0x01, 0x02) and renew the vector Y ′ accordingly.
Thus two 152-level circulant matrices M(ξ, θ), M ′(ξ, θ) can be derived from the vectors
Y and Y ′, respectively.
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– Compute the vectors ω = MZ and ω′ = M ′Z ′, respectively.
– Keep the ξ‖kc5 as a possible subkey candidate if it satisfies ωκ = ω
′
κ = 0.
Master Key Recovery. According to [21] and the Wrong-Key Randomization Hypothesis
given in [29], for a wrong subkey candidate, the probability that the correlation of Eq. (4) is
0 can be estimated as 1√
2π
2
4−128
2 . Therefore, the probability that a wrong subkey candidate
for ξ‖kc5 can pass the test in Step 4 of Distillation and Analysis phase is approximately
( 1√
2π
2−62)2 ≈ 2−126.6, thus about 2160 × 2−126.6 = 233.4 subkey candidates for ξ‖kc5 will be
left after the Distillation and Analysis phase. For each of the 233.4 values of ξ‖kc5, do the
following to recover the master key consisting of 128-bit KL and 64-bit (KR)L:
1. In terms of Table 2, the 160-bit subkey ka, kb{1,2,6,7,8}, k
c
5, k
d
8 , k
e
{1,4,5,6,7} and the 15 bits
of kl2, kl3 given in Eq. (2) are expressed in KL, KR, KA and KB as follows:
ka = (KL)L ⊕ (KR ≪15)L, (5)
kb{1,2,6,7,8} = ((KL)R ⊕ (KR ≪15)R){1,2,6,7,8}, (6)
kc5 = ((KL)L ⊕ (KA ≪15)L)5, (7)
kd8 = ((KB ≪111)L ⊕ (KR ≪60)R)8, (8)
ke{1,4,5,6,7} = ((KB ≪111)R ⊕ (KB ≪60)L){1,4,5,6,7}, (9)
kl2L[1, 9, 25] = (KR ≪30)R[1, 9, 25], (10)
kl2R[8, 16] = (KR ≪30)R[40, 48], (11)
kl3L[1, 16, 17, 24, 25, 32] = (KL ≪60)L[1, 16, 17, 24, 25, 32], (12)
kl3R[7, 8, 31, 32] = (KL ≪60)L[39, 40, 63, 64]. (13)
2. According to Eq. (10) and (11), we can get five bits of (KR ≪30)R. Guess the other 59 bits
of (KR ≪30)R, thus all the bits of (KR)L are known. Derive (KL)L, (KL)R,{1,2,6,7,8} from
Eq. (5) and (6), respectively. Check whether (KL)L[61] = (KL)R[12] = (KL)R[13] = 0 and
(KL)R[59] = (KL)R[60] = 1 hold or not. If not, discard the corresponding key candidate
(KL)L‖(KL)R,{1,2,6,7,8}‖(KR)L. After this step, there are about 259 × 2−5 = 254 possible
values for (KL)L‖(KL)R,{1,2,6,7,8}‖(KR)L.
3. Obtain the five bits (KL)R[20, 21, 28, 35, 36] according to Eq. (12) and (13), thus only 19
bits of (KL)R are unknown. Now we guess these 19 bits of (KL)R and compute KA, KB ac-
cording to the key schedule. With Eq. (7), (8) and (9) we filter out 2−56 wrong candidates
of KL‖(KR)L.
Then we have 233.4 × 254 × 219 × 2−56 = 250.4 key candidates KL‖(KR)L (i.e., the master
key) altogether. For each of the 250.4 key candidates, verify whether it is correct or not by
using one plaintext-ciphertext pair. If not, remove the key candidate. It is expected that only
the right key will be left.
Complexity of the Attack. The data complexity of this attack is 2128 known plaintexts.
The memory complexity is primarily owing to storing the vectors T , T ′, Z and Z ′ in the Distil-
lation and Analysis phase. Actually, the value of each counter in T is at most 2128/2105 = 223,
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thus the size of each counter in T can be estimated as 23 bits. Similarly, the size of each
counter in T ′, Z, Z ′ can be approximated as 23, 24, 24 bits respectively. Hence, the memory
complexity of this attack can be measured as 2×2154×23/8+2×2152×24/8 ≈ 2156.86 bytes.
Regarding the time complexity of this attack, it is mainly dominated by the matrix-vector
products MZ and M ′Z ′ in Step 4 of the Distillation and Analysis phase, which can be de-
rived as follows. For each possible value of ka5⊕k
c
5, the matrix-vector products MZ and M
′Z ′
require 2 × 3 × 152 × 2152 ≈ 2161.83 arithmetic operations by applying the FFT technique
described in Section 2.2. Accordingly, the time complexity of this attack can be measured
as 28 × 2161.83 = 2169.83 13-round Camellia-192 encryptions (Assume that one arithmetic
operation is equivalent to one 13-round Camellia-192 encryption).
4.2 Attacking 14-round Camellia-256
Let E′ denote the 14-round Camellia-256 with the FL/FL−1 and whitening layers from the
third round to the sixteenth round. Now we present a key recovery attack on E′ by using the
same two 8-round zero-correlation linear hulls as in Section 4.1 (See Fig. 4(b)).
Let ka = k1w⊕k
3, kb = k2w⊕k
4, kc = k1w⊕k
5, kd = k4w⊕k
14, ke = k3w⊕k
15 and kf = k4w⊕k
16.
Moreover, let θ, ξ denote PL‖PR,{1,2,6,7,8}‖CL,{1,4,5,6,7}‖CR and ka‖kb{1,2,6,7,8}‖k
e
{1,4,5,6,7}‖k
f ,
respectively. After that, in order to take the full advantage of the FFT technique to re-
duce the time complexity, we rewrite the linear approximation (a, a, 0, 0, a, 0, a, a) · X6L ⊕
(h, 0, 0, h, 0, h, h, h) ·X14R = 0 by doing partial encryption and decryption as shown below:
a · PR,5 ⊕ h · CL,8 ⊕ g(θ ⊕ ξ, k
a
5 ⊕ k
c
5, k
d
8 ⊕ k
f
8 )
= a · (kb1 ⊕ k
b
2 ⊕ k
b
7 ⊕ k
b
8)⊕ h · (k
e
1 ⊕ k
e
4 ⊕ k
e
6 ⊕ k
e
7),
(14)
where
g(θ ⊕ ξ, ka5 ⊕ k
c
5, k
d
8 ⊕ k
f
8 )
= a · (S2(θ5 ⊕ ξ5)⊕ θ{9,10,12,13} ⊕ ξ{9,10,12,13})
⊕h · (S1(θ26 ⊕ ξ26)⊕ θ{14,15,17,18} ⊕ ξ{14,15,17,18})
⊕a · S2(S1(F
3
1 (θ{1,3,4,6∼8} ⊕ ξ{1,3,4,6∼8})⊕ θ9 ⊕ ξ9)⊕
S2(F
3
2 (θ{1,2,4,5,7,8} ⊕ ξ{1,2,4,5,7,8})⊕ θ10 ⊕ ξ10)⊕
S3(F
3
6 (θ{2,3,5,7,8} ⊕ ξ{2,3,5,7,8})⊕ θ11 ⊕ ξ11)⊕
S4(F
3
7 (θ{3∼6,8} ⊕ ξ{3∼6,8})⊕ θ12 ⊕ ξ12)⊕
S1(F
3
8 (θ{1,4∼7} ⊕ ξ{1,4∼7})⊕ θ13 ⊕ ξ13)⊕
θ5 ⊕ ξ5 ⊕ k
a
5 ⊕ k
c
5)
⊕h · S1(S1(F
16
1 (θ{19,21,22,24∼26} ⊕ ξ{19,21,22,24∼26})⊕ θ14 ⊕ ξ14)⊕
S4(F
16
4 (θ{20∼25} ⊕ ξ{20∼25})⊕ θ15 ⊕ ξ15)⊕
S2(F
16
5 (θ{19,20,24∼26} ⊕ ξ{19,20,24∼26})⊕ θ16 ⊕ ξ16)⊕
S3(F
16
6 (θ{20,21,23,25,26} ⊕ ξ{20,21,23,25,26})⊕ θ17 ⊕ ξ17)⊕
S4(F
16
7 (θ{21∼24,26} ⊕ ξ{21∼24,26})⊕ θ18 ⊕ ξ18)⊕
θ26 ⊕ ξ26 ⊕ k
d
8 ⊕ k
f
8 ).
Then we can mount an attack on E′ similarly to that on E given in Section 4.1. The data,
memory and time complexities of this attack are about 2128 known plaintexts, 2212.86 bytes
and 2234.92 14-round Camellia-256 encryptions, respectively.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the security of Camellia by means of zero-correlation
linear cryptanalysis. Firstly, some new properties of the FL/FL−1 functions in Camellia
have been proposed, following which we have observed some weak keys and constructed the
first known 8-round zero-correlation linear distinguisher of Camellia with FL/FL−1 layers
for these weak keys. Since this distinguisher covers the same number of rounds as the best
known zero-correlation linear distinguisher for Camellia without FL/FL−1 layers, we claim
that FL/FL−1 layers cannot thwart zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis effectively for some
weak keys. Then by using this new distinguisher, we have presented key recovery attacks on
13-round Camellia-192 and 14-round Camellia-256 respectively. Note that our attacks work
for weak keys with 15-bit conditions on kl2 and kl3 which are actually the 15-bit conditions on
the master key, thus the advantages of these attacks over exhaustive search (measured in bits)
are about 192− 169.83− 15 = 7.17 and 256− 234.92− 15 = 6.08 bits respectively. Although
these results are the currently best for Camellia-192 and Camellia-256 with FL/FL−1 and
whitening layers in terms of the number of attacked rounds, none of the attacks directly
threatens the security of Camellia but they reduce the security margin of the cipher.
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